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nounced with higher quality corporate governance and a stronger legal
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reducing stock price crash risk in China. Our paper enriches the literature
on stock price crash risk and religion, and on new economic geography.
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The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 stimulated scholars’ interest in stock price crash risk. However, the
current literature mainly focuses on the relationship between formal institutions, such as corporate gover-
nance, and stock price crash risk. Relatively few studies explore the eﬀect of informal institutions such as reli-
gion. In China, an emerging and transitioning country, formal institutions such as investor protection systems,
corporate governance and accounting standards are less developed (Allen et al., 2005), listed ﬁrms’ opaqueness
is high and agency problems are severe. The Chinese stock market has therefore been experiencing big bubbles
and crashes (Piotroski and Wong, 2012). Unfortunately, many formal mechanisms that can eﬀectively reduce
stock price crash risk in mature capital markets fail to work in the Chinese capital market. When formal
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can play an alternative governance role. As Wei (2002) states, it is of great practical signiﬁcance to explore the
moral and ethical basis of the market economy from the perspective of informal institutions.
The role of informal institutions in corporate governance in China cannot be ignored and may even play a
more important role than previously thought (Chen et al., 2013). Religion, an important part of the informal
institutional environment, has a long history in China and greatly inﬂuences people’s behavior. When it comes
to the dramatically ﬂuctuating Chinese stock market, whether religion can reduce stock price crash risk is an
open question. Callen and Fang (2015) were the ﬁrst to study the eﬀect of religion on stock price crash risk in
the United States. However, the Chinese religious environment is very diﬀerent from that of America. First,
the religious faith of Chinese people does not necessarily identify belief, rather ‘‘belonging” (gui shu) and
‘‘participation” (can yu), unlike Western Christianity, which requires ‘‘conversion” (gui yi) and ‘‘commitment”
(wei sheng) (Zhang, 2015). Second, although Western religions are strongly doctrinaire, Chinese religions are
more secular. Chinese believers pay more attention to the function of the religion they participate in and the
choice of religion has a certain randomness; there is not such a great distinction between diﬀerent sects, such as
the diﬀerence between Catholicism and other types of Christianity. Third, Christianity, including Catholicism,
is a foreign religion, and Chinese believers’ religious attitudes may diﬀer from those of believers in the United
States. As the diﬀerences in the religious environments of China and Western countries are great, it is mean-
ingful to examine the inﬂuence of religion on stock price crash risk in China.
Therefore, we hand-collect details of 552 religious sites in 23 provinces and use China’s A-share listed com-
panies during 2003–2013 as our research sample. We investigate the relationship between religion and stock
price crash risk, and ﬁnd that religion can eﬀectively reduce stock price crash risk even after controlling for
other factors that inﬂuence the risk. In addition, we explore the following three questions: What is the channel
through which religion acts on crash risk? Do diﬀerent types of religions have diﬀerent eﬀects on crash risk? Is
there any variation in religion’s eﬀect on crash risk at diﬀerent levels of corporate governance?
The results show that (1) The mechanisms of religion’s inﬂuence on stock price crash risk are through
reducing earnings management and managers’ perk consumption. (2) Diﬀerent types of religions have diﬀerent
eﬀects on stock price crash risk. Speciﬁcally, Taoism has no inﬂuence on stock price crash risk whereas
Buddhism, Christianity, Catholicism and Islam have signiﬁcant eﬀects. These diﬀerences can be attributed
to the unique religious environment in China and Chinese people’s attitude toward religion. (3) The eﬀect
of religion on stock price crash risk depends on the institutional environment. Speciﬁcally, only when the qual-
ity of corporate governance and the legal environment is high does religion signiﬁcantly inﬂuence stock price
crash risk. These results show that the governance role of religion is conditional on higher quality corporate
governance and a strong external legal environment.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, there has been little research examining stock
price crash risk from the perspective of informal institutions; we examine the inﬂuence of religion on stock
price crash risk in the Chinese capital market, thus ﬁlling that void. The current literature studies the factors
aﬀecting stock price crash risk mainly from the perspective of formal institutions (e.g., Xu et al., 2013a,b; Chen
et al., forthcoming). As formal institutions are weak in China, it is not reasonable to ignore the role of infor-
mal institutions in corporate governance. Therefore, we explore whether religion can reduce stock price crash
risk in China. Our results show that religion plays an important role in constraining management opportunism
in China, which reduces stock price crash risk. We provide some evidence in support of Weber’s (1905) con-
tention that religion plays an important role in the development of modern secular culture in the context of
stock price crash risk.
Second, we further examine the mechanisms of religion’s eﬀect on stock price crash risk, to deepen our
understanding of how religion aﬀects stock price crash risk. The closest study to ours is that of Callen and
Fang (2015), who ﬁnd that religion can reduce stock price crash risk; however, they do not show how religion
exerts its eﬀect. To ﬁll this gap, we explore the mechanism of religion’s inﬂuence on stock price crash risk, and
ﬁnd that religion reduces stock price crash risk by mitigating management agency problems.
Third, our study also contributes to the literature on religion. Most studies of religion take Christianity as
their main research focus (e.g., Callen and Fang, 2015), and only a few papers examine the role of Buddhism
and/or Taoism in the context of China (Chen et al., 2013; Du, 2013, 2015; Du et al., 2014). These studies do
not analyze the diﬀerent eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of religion comprehensively. China’s culture of
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opportunity to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent religions. Jiang et al. (2015) compare the inﬂuence of Western
and Eastern religions on risk-taking. In this paper, we ﬁrst comprehensively study the eﬀect of diﬀerent types
of religion on stock price crash risk. In particular, we provide evidence that foreign religions (e.g., Christianity
and Catholicism) can constrain opportunistic management behavior and reduce stock price crash risk in
China.
Fourth, the new economic geography literature emphasizes the importance of geography on managers’ and
investors’ decision-making. Examples include how corporate location can aﬀect ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decision-
making (Almazan et al., 2010; Arena and Michael, 2012), mergers and acquisitions (Kang and Kim, 2008;
Kedia et al., 2008) and dividend policies (John et al., 2011). We ﬁnd that management decision-making is more
likely to be inﬂuenced in ﬁrms located in areas with higher levels of religiosity, and the crash risk of such ﬁrms
is lower. Therefore, our research also enriches the literature on new economic geography with the ﬁnding that
geographical location aﬀects stock price crash risk.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background of
religion in China, and reviews the literature and theoretical analysis. Section 3 describes the sample, variable
measurement and research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results and robustness checks. Section 5
further explores the relationship between religion and stock price crash risk and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Institutional background, literature and theoretical analysis
2.1. Religion in China
The proportion of the population identifying as religious adherents has reached as high as 84% worldwide
by 2010, and is expected to increase in the next four decades (Pew Research Center, 2015). The role that
religion plays in the social, political and economic ﬁelds is gradually being conﬁrmed, and research on Chinese
religion is just getting started (Jin and Qiu, 2008). In particular, the economic consequences of religion remain
largely unexplored in the ﬁnancial accounting research. In fact, religions including Buddhism, Taoism, Chris-
tianity and Islam, as well as folk religions, have a long history in China. Buddhism was introduced in the Han
Dynasty over 2000 years ago, Taoism originated in China more than 1700 years ago, Islam has a history of
more than 1300 years in China, and Christianity, including Catholicism, came to China in the early nineteenth
century.
A paradoxical view, the so-called ‘‘Chinese religion of no importance theory” believes that China as a
nation lacks religious belief, as religion does not play an important role or have an essential position in
Chinese society. However, Yang (1961) notes that:The under-evaluation of the place of religion in Chinese society did not ﬁnd much support from reality.
There was not one corner in the vast land of China where one did not ﬁnd temples, shrines, altars and
other places of worship. The temples and shrines dotting the entire landscape were a visible indication of
the strong and pervasive inﬂuence of religion in Chinese society, for they stood as symbols of a social
reality.Unlike Western institutional religion, which has a system of theology, rituals and organization of its own,
independent of other secular social institutions, Chinese religions are diﬀused (Yang, 1961), that is, their faith,
rituals and religious activities are merged with daily life and have become a part of everyday life. As a result of
the combining of religious doctrine and daily life, China’s diﬀused religion does not have a systematic scripture
or well organized church institution; at its core is worship of heaven, respect of forefathers and polytheism.
The weakness of formally organized religion in China does not imply the absence of an important function
played by religious structural systems in Chinese society and culture (He, 2007). A Chinese person with faith
in religion does not necessarily identify as being a religious adherent, but rather as a believer in Buddhism or
Taoism, going into a temple ‘‘to pilgrimage,” where what is required is not formal religious ceremony, but ‘‘a
sincere heart that can work wonders” and ‘‘doing good deeds unto others.”
Even during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution in China, when the government adopted a policy of
eradicating religions, the embers of Chinese religion were never extinguished. After the Cultural Revolution,
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activities have been restored and people’s right to freedom of religious belief is respected and protected by law
(Du, 2010). As a result, religion has been re-ﬂourishing and aﬀecting people’s behavior in the following ways.
First, more and more people believe in religion. Religion is gradually being recognized as a cultural
phenomenon reﬂecting a kind of culture or core value of civilization, rather than a symbol of ignorance or
backwardness as in the past (Du, 2010). By 2012, there were over 10 million Chinese religious adherents, more
than 139,000 religious activity sites, more than 360,000 religious workers, and at least 5500 religious groups in
China (Li, 2013). Second, the inﬂuence of religion on entrepreneurs or managers is increasingly important.
Religious belief provides people with emotional support (Idler, 1987). With globalization of economies and
consequent increasing competition, entrepreneurs and managers facing a growing level of anxiety turn to
religion for spiritual relaxation, comfort and peace of mind. For example, a large number of elite businesspeo-
ple have joined the Beijing International Christian Fellowship, and in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, entrepre-
neurs are called ‘‘religious boss” for their faith in Christianity (Chen, 2005). Thirdly, religious activity sites
have been rehabilitated. Religious temples, as scenic tourism spots in China, are often refurbished by local
governments on the grounds of ‘‘protecting cultural relics and maintaining tourist attractions” (Du, 2013).
In addition, adherents and entrepreneurs donate to construct or repair temples, as in the case of Wang Jianlin,
the chairman of the board of Dalian Wanda Group Co., Ltd., who donated 1 billion yuan indirectly to Da
Bao0en Temple through the Nanjing municipal government. The improvement of religious activity sites and
their surrounding infrastructure has greatly contributed to the dissemination and development of a religious
spirit in China.
2.2. Literature review and hypothesis development
Stock price crash risk arises when managers withhold bad news. When the accumulated negative informa-
tion reaches a tipping point, as the Chinese proverb says, ‘‘truth will come to light sooner or later.” The infor-
mation will be suddenly released to the stock market and the stock price will fall sharply, i.e., a stock price
crash. The lower a company’s transparency, the higher the information asymmetry between managers and
outside investors, so managers will be likely to hide negative information, resulting in an abrupt decline in
stock price. The current literature has supported this view on the basis of agency theory. Kim et al.
(2011a) provide evidence that when managers are using corporate tax avoidance as a resource transfer vehicle
(‘‘tunneling”), concealing unfavorable information and masking the ﬁrm performance excessively, the accu-
mulated negative information will lead to a stock price crash. Also based on agency theory, Kim et al.
(2011b) ﬁnd that granting managers, especially the CFO, options will lead to stock price crash risk. Scholars
also ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ real earnings management (Francis et al., 2014), manager overconﬁdence (Kim et al.,
forthcoming), perk consumption (Xu et al., 2014), political promotions (Piotroski et al., 2015) and mandatory
IFRS adoption (DeFond et al., 2011) will increase stock price crash risk. However, female managers (Li and
Liu, 2012), tax enforcement (Jiang, 2013), accounting conservatism (Kim and Zhang, 2016), higher corporate
transparency (Hutton et al., 2009), higher quality internal controls (Ye et al., 2015; Chen et al., forthcoming),
auditor industry specialization (Jiang and Yi, 2013), corporate social responsibility (Kim et al., 2014), good
corporate governance (Andreou et al., forthcoming) and the proportion held by block shareholders (Wang
et al., 2015) will reduce stock price crash risk. In short, managerial opportunism will enable managers to
hide bad news, and when the accumulated negative information reaches a critical threshold, it will suddenly
be released to the stock market all at once, leading to a crash. However, the eﬀect of governance on stock price
crash risk varies across institutional environments.
Institutional constructions are still weak in China, which is a transitional economy. External corporate
governance mechanisms that can eﬀectively reduce stock price crash risk in developed countries, such as
the presence of ﬁnancial analysts and institutional investors, exacerbate rather than reduce stock price crash
risk in China’s capital market (Xu et al., 2013a,b). When institutional mechanisms fail to reduce stock price
crash risk, can religion, as one of the informal institutions, play a role in constraining management oppor-
tunism? Iannaccone (1998) points out that religion shapes personal values and beliefs, and has an important
eﬀect on people’s economic behavior and decision-making. Recent studies also conﬁrm that religion has an
eﬀect on information disclosure (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Dyreng et al., 2012), a ﬁrm’s risk-taking or risk
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(EI Ghoul et al., 2012), ﬁnancial reporting irregularities or earnings management (McGuire et al., 2012;
Chen et al., 2013), corporate philanthropic giving (Du et al., 2014), entrepreneurship (Nunziata and Rocco,
2011; Ruan et al., 2014) and tunneling (Du, 2015). The paper most relevant to our research is Callen and
Fang (2015), which reports that ﬁrms headquartered in countries with higher levels of religiosity exhibit lower
levels of future stock price crash risk.
From the literature review, we can see that on the one hand, the main reason for stock price crash risk is the
agency problem; the literature provides evidence mainly from the perspective of formal rather than informal
institutions. On the other hand, the literature provides preliminary evidence that religion can inﬂuence the
behavior of managers and investors. This paper argues that religion can alleviate principal–agent problems,
thus reducing stock price crash risk.
First, religion can reduce stock price crash risk by alleviating earnings management behavior. Although
diﬀerent religions have diﬀerent doctrines, they all emphasize moral and ethical standards, requesting honest
and trustworthy behavior, upholding human needs and breaking the pursuit of secular, material and sensual
pleasures. For example, as a basic moral principle, Buddhism demands ‘‘do not be evil, pursue the public good
and self puriﬁcation” and takes the ‘‘Five Precepts” as its basic ethical standard (Zhang, 2007). Christianity
requires that Christians must ‘‘not give false testimony” (they should be honest), and must not be greedy (they
should not do anything unethically for personal gain). Burckhardt (1979) points out that ‘‘religion is the most
important link to maintain the human society, because only it can be qualiﬁed to act as a guardian of a par-
ticular moral state.” By reducing a ﬁrm’s information opacity, self-interested managers often try to manipulate
the ﬁrm’s stock price. People who have religious beliefs tend to hold traditional views on moral issues and have
conservative moral standards (Barnett et al., 1996), and constrain their own manipulative behavior. People
who have religious beliefs are often risk-averse (Miller, 2000; Diaz, 2000). Once the manipulation of bad news
is discovered, managers will be exposed to the risk of litigation (McGuire et al., 2012). Therefore, to reduce the
risk of being sued, religious managers will engage in less earnings manipulation, which will lead to lower stock
price crash risk.
Second, religion can reduce stock price crash risk by inhibiting managers’ self-interested behavior.
Religious managers will reduce their desires and greed through inner practice and abstinence, thus alleviating
the agency problem. Companies in China, especially state-owned enterprises, have compensation regulations.
Therefore, managers generally have a strong incentive to pursue excessive perks to make up their loss in com-
pensation. As a result, pursuing perks is a serious agency problem in Chinese companies. Xu et al. (2014) ﬁnd
that to get more perks, managers may conceal bad news by portraying inappropriate resource consumption as
eﬀective resource utilization, and to achieve the purpose of empire building, managers will make short-sighted
over-investment disguised as valuable investment. These actions will lead to the continuous accumulation of
bad news and thus ultimately to a stock price crash. Du (2013) notes that religion can reduce managers’ pur-
suit of perks. Therefore, religion can reduce stock price crash risk by alleviating the agency problem of man-
agers’ perk consumption.
In summary, religion plays an important role in mitigating agency problems, especially in the case of weak
external supervision mechanisms (McGuire et al., 2012). We therefore believe that the stronger the religious
atmosphere where listed companies are located, the lower the future stock price crash risk, because agency
problems are likely to be suppressed.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
Our initial sample consists of all Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013. Following previous
studies, we screen the sample and exclude (1) ﬁnancial ﬁrms, (2) ﬁrms with fewer than 30 trading weeks of
stock return data in a ﬁscal year (Jin and Myers, 2006), (3) ﬁrms whose transaction status is special treatment
(ST) or particular transfer (PT), and (4) observations with incomplete ﬁnancial data. To mitigate the eﬀects of
outliers, we winsorize continuous variables at the 1% level in both tails. Our ﬁnancial data is obtained from the
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11,171 ﬁrm-year observations.
Following Chen et al. (2013), we collect data on 552 religious sites in 23 provinces in China as follows: (1)
148 provincial key temples mentioned in the Report by the Religious Aﬀairs Bureau under the State Council
about Determining Buddhism and Taoism National Key Temples in the Han Nationality Area; and (2) venues
for religious activities that were awarded ‘‘The First National Advanced Collectives and Individuals in Estab-
lishing Harmonious Temples” by the China State Administration of Religious Aﬀairs in 2010.1
3.2. Variable measurement
3.2.1. Measuring ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk
Following Kim et al. (2011a,b), we use two measures of stock price crash risk. We ﬁrst estimate ﬁrm-speciﬁc
weekly returns, denoted Wi,t, as the natural log of one plus the residual return from the expanded market
model regression for each ﬁrm and year:1 We
diﬀere
the sam
2 A
religio
Theref
religioRi;t ¼ ai þ b1Rm;t2 þ b2Rm;t1 þ b3Rm;t þ b4Rm;tþ1 þ b5Rm;tþ2 þ ei;t ð1Þ
where Ri,t is the return that considers the yields on cash dividend reinvestment on stock i in week t and Rm,t is
the value-weighted market return in week t. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly returns for ﬁrm i in week t are measured
by Wi,t = Ln(1 + ei,t), where ei,t is the residual in Eq. (1).
Second, we construct the following two variables based on Wi,t:
(1) The negative coeﬃcient of skewness, NCSKEW
Xh i X 3=2 
NCSKEW i;t ¼  nðn 1Þ3=2 W 3i;t ðn 1Þðn 2Þ W 2i;t ð2Þwhere n is the number of trading weeks of stock i in year t. A higher value of NCSKEW means a higher skew-
ness coeﬃcient, corresponding to a greater stock crash risk.
(2) The down-to-up volatility, DUVOLDUVOLi;t ¼ log ðnu  1Þ
X
down
W 2i;t ðnd  1Þ
X
up
W 2i;t
,( )
ð3Þwhere nu and nd are the number of up and down weeks in year t, respectively. A higher value of DUVOL
indicates a more left-skewed distribution, which means a stock has a greater crash risk.
3.2.2. Measuring religion
The managers of ﬁrms registered in areas with higher levels of religiosity (i.e., a more pronounced religious
atmosphere) will be more likely to participate in religious activities than managers in areas with lower levels of
religiosity, and thus these managers will be more easily inﬂuenced by religion.
Following Du (2013) and Du et al. (2014), we calculate the distance between the registered address of the
listed company and the site of religious activity to measure the degree to which managers are aﬀected by
religion. The detailed procedure is as follows.2combine the two reports to reﬂect the overall eﬀect of temples in China and to analyze whether diﬀerent kinds of religion have
nt eﬀects on Chinese enterprises. In addition, we follow Chen et al. (2013) and only use the 148 provincial key temples; the results are
e (untabulated).
more direct measure of the eﬀect of religion on corporate executives is the distance between the birthplace of top executives and
us temples. However, due to issues of personal privacy, it is very diﬃcult to acquire data about the birthplaces of the executives.
ore, following Du (2013) and Du et al. (2014), we calculate the distance between the registered address of the listed company and the
us activities site to measure the degree to which managers are aﬀected by religion.
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ple according to its registered address. Similarly, we check the geographic location of every religious activities
site in our sample and obtain its longitude and latitude.
Second, we calculate the distance between each ﬁrm and the religious activities sites according to their
respective longitudes and latitudes, equaling the length of the minor arc across the surface of the earth. RELI-
GION is the number of famous temples within a 200 km radius of the ﬁrm’s registered address. The higher the
value, the stronger the eﬀect of managers inﬂuenced by religion. We also use the number of temples within a
100 km and a 300 km radius around the ﬁrm to proxy for religion for robust results. The formulae are as
follows:cos h ¼ sin latr  sin latf þ cos latr  cos latf  cosðlonr  lonf Þ ð4Þ
rad ¼ ð40075:04=360Þ  ð180=pÞ ð5Þ
d ¼ rad ðp=2 arctanðcos h=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 cos2 h
p
ÞÞ ð6Þwhere d is the distance between the registered address of each ﬁrm and a temple. We deﬁne the longitude and
latitude of a temple (a ﬁrm) as lonr and latr (lonf and latf), respectively.
3.2.3. Control variables
We control for several factors shown to inﬂuence crash likelihood (Chen et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2011a,b).
First, we control for the lag value of crash risk to account for the potential serial correlation of NCSKEW and
DUVOL. Stocks with higher volatility are more likely to experience a crash in the future, so we control for
weekly return volatility (SIGMA). Hutton et al. (2009) show that ﬁrms with earnings management are more
prone to suﬀer from a future crash, so we include the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABACC), mea-
sured as the previous three year’s moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discre-
tionary accruals are estimated by the modiﬁed Jones model. We control for the de-trended share turnover
(TURNOVER), calculated as the average monthly share turnover in year t minus the average monthly share
turnover in year t  1. As past returns can help to forecast crash risk, we control for past returns (RET) mea-
sured as the mean of ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly returns over the ﬁscal year. Similarly, we control for the market-to-
book ratio (MB) because those ﬁrms with higherMB are also predicted to have a higher crash risk. To control
for the size eﬀect, we include ﬁrm size (SIZE), calculated as the natural log of the book value of total assets.
We also control for leverage (LEV), calculated as debt divided by total assets, and proﬁtability measured by
return on assets (ROA). As the quality of auditors and property rights will aﬀect a ﬁrm’s transparency, we also
control for audit quality (BIG4) which is equal to one if the ﬁrm engages a Big4 audit ﬁrm and zero otherwise,
and the ownership of the ﬁrm (SOE) which is equal to one if the ﬁrm is a state-owned enterprise and zero
otherwise.
3.3. The empirical model
To test whether religion will reduce stock price crash risk, we design the empirical model as follows:CrashRiski;t ¼ a0 þ a1  RELIGIONi;t1 þ a2  Controlsi;t1 þ ei;t1 ð7Þ
We include industry and year dummies to control for industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects in all regressions. We
report t-values based on robust standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. A signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient of a1 indi-
cates that religion can reduce stock price crash risk.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The mean values of NCSKEWt and
DUVOLt are 0.19 and 0.18, respectively. The mean value of NCSKEWt is similar to the estimates in
Chen et al. (forthcoming). The respective standard deviations of NCSKEWt and DUVOLt are 0.61 and
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Median Max.
NCSKEWt 11,171 0.19 0.61 1.84 0.19 1.43
DUVOLt 11,171 0.18 0.45 1.29 0.18 0.93
RELIGIONt1100 11,171 10.29 8.15 0.00 9.00 36.00
RELIGIONt1200 11,171 28.04 21.58 0.00 23.00 93.00
RELIGIONt1300 11,171 48.81 35.55 0.00 43.00 127.00
DTURNOVERt1 11,171 0.01 0.33 0.88 0.00 0.84
RETt1 11,171 0.10 0.06 0.30 0.09 0.01
SIGMAt1 11,171 4.27 1.38 1.63 4.17 7.85
SIZEt1 11,171 21.77 1.15 19.38 21.64 25.33
LEVt1 11,171 0.50 0.18 0.08 0.51 0.89
ROAt1 11,171 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.20
MBt1 11,171 1.65 1.00 0.75 1.28 6.54
ABACCt1 11,171 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.28
SOEt1 11,171 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00
BIG4t1 11,171 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00
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RELIGIONt1200 is 28.04, meaning that there are on average 28 temples within a 200 km radius of the ﬁrm’s
registered address.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the location distribution of religious temples and the listed companies. There are
no religious temples within 100 km of 10.69% of the listed companies, and the percentage of ﬁrms with no
religious sites within the radius declines gradually with distance. Panel B reports the results of the univariate
tests. We distinguish between ﬁrms aﬀected by high and low degrees of religion; a value higher than the med-
ian indicates a high degree of religious inﬂuence, and a value lower than the median indicates a low degree of
religious inﬂuence. We can see that whether NCSKEWt or DUVOLt is used to measure stock price crash risk,
there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between a high and low degree of religion, implying that ﬁrms registered in
areas with higher levels of religiosity are less prone to crashes, providing preliminary support for our
conjecture.
4.2. The eﬀect of religion on crash risk
Table 3 presents the results of our regression analysis of the relation between religion and future ﬁrm-
speciﬁc stock price crash risk after controlling for other potential factors that inﬂuence crash risk. We can
see that whether the future ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk is measured as NCSKEWt or DUVOLt, the estimated coef-
ﬁcients of RELIGIONt1200 are both signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level (t-values = 2.89 and 3.30). This
ﬁnding supports our hypothesis; that is, the more religious the environment where a listed ﬁrm is located, the
lower the future ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk, which is consistent with the view that religion can play a positive roleTable 2
Location distribution of temples and listed ﬁrms and univariate tests.
Temples within x km of the ﬁrm 100 km % 200 km % 300 km %
Panel A: Location distribution of temples and listed ﬁrms
Yes 9977 89.31 10,216 91.45 10,527 94.24
No 1194 10.69 955 8.55 644 5.76
Total 11,171 100 11,171 100 11,171 100
Higher religious inﬂuence Lower religious inﬂuence Diﬀ. t-Value p-Value
Panel B: Univariate tests
NCSKEWt 0.204 0.180 0.025 2.132 0.016
DUVOLt 0.188 0.166 0.021 2.562 0.005
Table 3
Regression analysis on the eﬀect of religion on crash risk.
Dependent variable (1) (2)
NCSKEWt DUVOLt
RELIGIONt1200 0.810*** 0.693***
(2.89) (3.30)
NCSKEWt1 0.005
(0.50)
DUVOLt1 0.004
(0.42)
DTURNOVERt1 0.037 0.018
(1.54) (1.00)
RETt1 2.445
*** 1.830***
(4.66) (4.63)
SIGMAt1 0.120
*** 0.085***
(4.83) (4.68)
SIZEt1 0.022*** 0.016***
(2.92) (2.95)
LEVt1 0.107
*** 0.064**
(2.76) (2.23)
ROAt1 0.714
*** 0.485***
(5.46) (5.06)
MBt1 0.048
*** 0.030***
(6.24) (5.04)
ABACCt1 0.064 0.008
(0.50) (0.08)
BIG4t1 0.001 0.002
(0.03) (0.14)
SOEt1 0.029** 0.030***
(2.28) (3.13)
Constant 0.184 0.158
(1.00) (1.22)
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
N 11,171 11,171
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.063
F 21.17 19.71
Notes: t-values are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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more people are becoming religious adherents and the inﬂuence of religion will gradually become more impor-
tant. Overall, our results oﬀer some evidence that religion can constrain managerial opportunism, mitigate the
adverse eﬀect of a sudden release of bad news and thus reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk.
The coeﬃcients of the control variables are generally consistent with prior research. First, the coeﬃcients of
RETt1, SIGMAt1 and MBt1 are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1% level, which is consistent with Chen et al.
(2001) and Jiang and Yi (2013). Second, the coeﬃcients of ABACCt1 and DTURNOVERt1 are both
insigniﬁcant, which is also consistent with studies of stock price crash risk based on Chinese data (e.g., Xu
et al., 2012).
4.3. Robustness checks
Our result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests as follows (untabulated).
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We calculate the number of religious activity sites within a 100 km and 300 km radius around the ﬁrm’s reg-
istered address as two alternative proxies for the religious variable and then re-estimate Eq. (7). Our results still
hold using these two alternativemeasurements.Whether the religious variable is measured as the number of tem-
ples within 100 km, 200 km or 300 km, the coeﬃcients of RELIGIONt1 are all signiﬁcantly negative. In addi-
tion, the absolute value of the religious coeﬃcient decreases with distance, suggesting that ﬁrms closer to
religious activity sites are less prone to crashes. The results for other control variables are consistent with the pre-
vious ﬁndings.4.3.2. The inﬂuence of analysts and institutional investors
Xu et al. (2013a,b) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial analysts and institutional investors can also aﬀect ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash
risk. To alleviate the eﬀect of omitted variables, we include ANALYSTt1 and INSTIt1 in the model. The
results show that the coeﬃcient of RELIGIONt1200 is still signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level after control-
ling for ﬁnancial analysts and institutional investors. Consistent with Xu et al. (2013a,b), ANALYSTt1 and
INSTIt1 are associated with positive stock price crash risk. These ﬁndings indicate that in terms of stock price
crash risk, external governance mechanisms in the Chinese capital market fail to work eﬀectively; instead, they
increase the volatility of the stock market.5. Further research
5.1. The mechanisms of religion’s eﬀect on ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk
According to the above theoretical analyses, religion will weaken principal–agent problems and thus reduce
stock price crash risk. Speciﬁcally, religion can reduce stock price crash risk by mitigating earnings manage-
ment and perk consumption. To test the pathways via which religion acts on stock price crash risk, we use the
Sobel intermediary factor test method (Baron and Kenny, 1986) to analyze the intermediary eﬀect. Taking the
earnings management intermediary eﬀect as an example, we design the following models:CrashRiski;t ¼ a0 þ a1  RELIGIONi;t1 þ a2  Controlsi;t1 þ ei;t1 ð8Þ
EMi;t ¼ b0 þ b1  RELIGIONi;t1 þ b2  Controlsi;t1 þ li;t1 ð9Þ
CrashRiski;t ¼ c0 þ c1  RELIGIONi;t1 þ c2  EMi;t þ c3  Controlsi;t1 þ di;t1 ð10Þwhere a1 in Eq. (8) is the total eﬀect of religion on stock price crash risk, b1 in Eq. (9) is the eﬀect of religion on
earnings management, and c2 in Eq. (10) is the eﬀect of the intermediate variables of earnings management on
stock price crash risk. The mediation eﬀect of earnings management is an indirect eﬀect, that is, the product of
b1 and c2. The relationship between them is the total eﬀect = direct eﬀect + mediator eﬀect, that is,
a1 = c1 + b1c2. One of the key steps in testing the mediating eﬀect is to test the null hypothesis b1  c2 = 0.
The Sobel test is the most well-known method (Sobel, 1982). The test statistic Z ¼ b1c2=sb1c2 , where
sb1c2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b21s2c2 þ c22s2b1
q
is the standard error of b1c2, and sb1 and sc2 are the standard errors of b1 and c2, respec-
tively. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then there is an intermediary eﬀect.
Table 4 presents the intermediary eﬀects of regression testing. Panel A shows the results for whether religion
reduces ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk by reducing earnings management. We use discretionary accruals to measure
earnings management. In Column (1), the coeﬃcient of RELIGIONt1 is 0.755, and signiﬁcant at 1% level,
which is consistent with previous ﬁndings suggesting that religion reduces stock price crash risk. In Column
(2), the coeﬃcient of RELIGIONt1 is also signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that religion can reduce the earn-
ings management problem, consistent with Chen et al. (2013). When we add the intermediary factor EMt into
model (1), the absolute value of the coeﬃcient decreases from 0.755 to 0.733, and is still signiﬁcantly negative
at the 1% level. The Sobel Z value is 1.89, which is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, suggesting that there is a
Table 4
Mechanisms of religion’s inﬂuence on crash risk.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NCSKEWt EMt/PERKt NCSKEWt DUVOLt EMt/PERKt DUVOLt
Panel A: Earnings management channel
RELIGIONt1200 0.755*** 0.076** 0.733*** RELIGIONt1200 0.663*** 0.076** 0.651***
(2.70) (2.24) (2.63) (3.16) (2.24) (3.12)
EMt 0.317
*** EMt 0.164
**
(3.50) (2.41)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Year Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Industry Yes Yes Yes
N 11,032 11,032 11,032 N 11,032 11,032 11,032
Adj-R2 0.074 0.074 0.075 Adj-R2 0.067 0.074 0.067
F 21.94 15.51 22.01 F 20.55 15.51 20.4
Sobel Z (p-value) 1.89 (0.0588) Sobel Z (p-value) 1.64 (0.1009)
Panel B: Perk consumption channel
RELIGIONt1200 0.749*** 0.298*** 0.650** RELIGIONt1200 0.662*** 0.298*** 0.595***
(2.68) (4.13) (2.34) (3.17) (4.13) (2.86)
PERKt 0.354
*** PERKt 0.250
***
(5.48) (5.57)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Year Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Industry Yes Yes Yes
N 11,032 11,027 11,027 N 11,032 11,027 11,027
Adj-R2 0.074 0.201 0.076 Adj-R2 0.067 0.201 0.069
F 21.46 19.78 22.07 F 20.08 19.78 20.93
Sobel Z (p-value) 3.30 (0.0009) Sobel Z (p-value) 3.32 (0.0009)
Notes: t-values are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Overall, Columns (1)–(3) show that religion does reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk by reducing earnings
management.
Panel B of Table 4 shows whether religion reduces stock price crash risk by means of moderating the prob-
lem of perk consumption. We use management fees to measure managers’ perk consumption (Ang et al.,
2000).4 In Column (2), the coeﬃcient of RELIGIONt1 is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, indicating that
religion can reduce managers’ perk consumption signiﬁcantly, which is consistent with Du (2013). In Column
(1), the coeﬃcient of RELIGIONt1 is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level. However, when we add the inter-
mediary factor of PERKt into model (1), the absolute value of the coeﬃcient of RELIGIONt1 decreases from
0.749 to 0.650, and both are signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level. The Sobel Z value is 3.30 and signiﬁcant at
the 1% level, showing that there is a partial mediation eﬀect of perk consumption. The ratio of the indirect
eﬀect to the direct eﬀect is 15.01%.
The results in Table 4 show that religion reduces ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk by reducing agency problems such
as earnings management and perk consumption.3 The indirect eﬀect of earnings management is 0.024 (0.076  0.317), whereas the direct eﬀect is 0.733, so the value of the indirect
eﬀect accounted for by the direct eﬀect is 3.28%.
4 We also use sales management expense ratio to measure perk consumption; the result is consistent.
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Previous studies on the economic consequences of religion have only rarely examined the eﬀect of diﬀerent
types of religion, thus failing to fully reﬂect the eﬀect of diﬀerent religions. Fortunately, the uniqueness of
China’s religious policy and environment give us the opportunity to study the role diﬀerent religions played
in corporate governance.
In America, Christianity is dominant, whereas China is a country of religious diversity, with the ﬁve major
religions being Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianity and Islam. To further study the diﬀerent eﬀects
of diﬀerent kinds of religions on corporate governance in China we divide the sample into ﬁve subsamples—
Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianity and Islam—and then regress them respectively. Table 5 reports
the eﬀects of these diﬀerent religions on crash risk. We can see that the coeﬃcients of the religion variable are
all signiﬁcantly negative except for that of Taoism, which implies that Buddhism, Catholicism, Christianity
and Islam reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk whereas Taoism does not. Our ﬁndings are consistent with Du
(2013), who compares the inﬂuence of Buddhism and Taoism on agency costs and ﬁnds that only Buddhism
can signiﬁcantly reduce a company’s agency costs. We can also see that foreign religions such as Christianity
can signiﬁcantly reduce stock price crash risk. Callen and Fang (2015) ﬁnd that Christianity can signiﬁcantly
reduce stock price crash risk in the United States. Columns (3) and (8) of Table 5 are consistent with the result
of Callen and Fang (2015). The results show that the dissemination of Christianity into China can eﬀectively
restrain managers’ hiding of negative news, as well as reducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk. Prior to research study-
ing Western religions ﬁnds that the governance role that religion plays comes predominantly from Protes-
tantism rather than from Catholicism (EI Ghoul et al., 2012). Our results show that both Catholicism and
Christianity can play a signiﬁcant role in corporate governance to reduce stock price crash risk. This is mainly
due to the unique Chinese religious environment and the diﬀerences between American and Chinese attitudes
to religion. In China, religious adherents do not strictly distinguish between religious sects, instead, they pay
more attention to the function of religion, and are even blind to worship and faith in god (Liang, 2002). There-
fore, foreign religions, whether Protestant Christianity or Catholicism, can both have a governing eﬀect on the
managers of listed companies in China.Table 5
Inﬂuence of diﬀerent types of religion on crash risk.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
NCSKEWt DUVOLt
Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholicism Islam Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholicism Islam
RELIGIONt1200 1.136** 1.109***
(2.50) (3.26)
RELIGIONt1200 3.668 3.125
(1.25) (1.42)
RELIGIONt1200 3.326** 2.448**
(2.53) (2.47)
RELIGIONt1200 7.836** 7.602***
(2.53) (3.34)
RELIGIONt1200 4.654** 2.843*
(2.39) (1.90)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,032 11,032 11,032 11,032 11,032 11,032 11,032 11,032 11,032 11,032
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.066
F 21.46 21.06 21.35 21.37 21.20 20.09 19.73 19.99 20.11 19.76
Notes: t-values are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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There is a debate over whether the eﬀect of formal and informal institutions on managers’ behavior is sup-
plementary or one of substitution. On the one hand, from the perspective of corporate governance, if the qual-
ity of corporate governance is low, managerial opportunism may be extreme. It is doubtful that religion can
constrain managers to hide bad news in companies with lower-quality governance. However, Callen and Fang
(2015) ﬁnd that the negative relationship between religion and future crash risk is stronger for ﬁrms with
weaker corporate governance in the United States, which implies that there is a substitutable relationship
between religion and corporate governance working on ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk. On the other hand, from
the perspective of external governance mechanisms, because religion is part of the social rather than the legal
culture, whether people abide by religious doctrines depends on their moral self-discipline rather than the law.
There is theoretically a supplementary or substitutional relationship between religion and institutional gover-
nance mechanisms. Based on China’s institutional background, Chen et al. (2013) point out that religion inﬂu-
ences actors’ utility functions and risk attitudes, and people are willing to pay a higher cost to achieve a higher
standard. Therefore, they argue that the relationship between religion and corporate governance is more com-
plementary than substitutional, and their empirical results support this idea.
To comprehensively reﬂect the relationship between religion and governance mechanisms in terms of crash
risk, we analyze the two aspects of internal governance and external governance. However, there may be an
endogeneity problem because religion can also aﬀect corporate governance (Chen et al., 2013). To avoid this
problem, we do not use conventional variables to measure corporate governance.5
The Chinese government mandated IFRS adoption in 2007; the non-tradable shares reform ended in the
same year and the ‘‘New Company Law” had been in force for one year. As a result, the quality of Chinese
listed ﬁrms’ corporate governance has greatly increased since 2007. Therefore, we use the external shock in
2007 to separate the subsample of high-quality corporate governance (after 2007) from the subsample of
low quality governance (before 2007). The advantage of using this measure is that the change of corporate
governance is an exogenous shock, and therefore not inﬂuenced by religion. Following Chen et al. (2013),
we use the legal environment where the ﬁrm is located to measure the quality of external governance.6
Table 6 presents the results of the cross-sectional analyses. Column (2) in Panel A and Column (8) in Panel
B show that in the high-quality corporate governance group, the coeﬃcients of religion are signiﬁcantly neg-
ative at the 1% level, but in the low-quality corporate governance group (Column (1) in Panel A and Column
(7) in Panel B), the coeﬃcients of religion are insigniﬁcant. These results suggest that in China, there is a com-
plementary relationship between religion and internal governance, which is inconsistent with the ﬁnding
reported in Callen and Fang (2015). The reason may be that the overall corporate governance level is higher
in America and the quality of internal corporate governance is relatively low in China. In this case, it is
diﬃcult for religion to play a governance role. In terms of external governance, Column (4) in Panel A and
Column (10) in Panel B show that in the strong legal environment group, the coeﬃcients of religion are
signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level (NCSKEWt) or 1% level (DUVOLt), but in the weak legal environment
group, the coeﬃcients of religion are insigniﬁcant (Column (3) in Panel A and Column (9) in Panel B). The
results suggest that the relationship between religion and external governance is supplementary, which is also
consistent with Chen et al. (2013).
Whether religion can eﬀectively reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk depends on the quality of the governance
environment. Speciﬁcally, religion can eﬀectively play a governance role only in ﬁrms with high-quality inter-
nal governance in a strong legal environment. These results imply that religion cannot completely replace
internal governance and a strong legal system; when internal corporate governance and the legal environment
are of high enough quality, they create a situation in which religion can exert an eﬀect.5 We also use traditional corporate governance variables such as the duality of the CEO and chairman of the board (Kim et al., 2014)
and separation of ownership and control to measure corporate governance; the results are consistent.
6 Variables are deﬁned as follows: we use the mean of Fang Gang index in provinces to measure the development of the legal
environment from 2001 to 2009. When the provincial legal development level is higher than the median, then LAW = 1, otherwise
LAW = 0. LAW equal to 1 indicates that the company’s external governance is better.
Table 6
Cross-sectional analyses of governance environments.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 6 2007 Year > 2007 LAW = 0 LAW = 1
Panel A: Dependent variable = NCSKEWt
RELIGIONt1200 0.609 0.883*** 0.009 0.749**
(1.16) (2.71) (0.01) (2.34)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3642 7390 2522 8510
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.075 0.064 0.075
Panel B: Dependent variable = DUVOLt
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Year 6 2007 Year > 2007 LAW = 0 LAW = 1
RELIGIONt1200 0.627 0.752*** 0.311 0.655***
(1.64) (3.12) (0.48) (2.74)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3642 7390 2522 8510
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.064 0.053 0.069
Notes: t-values are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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The past decade has seen increasing attention given to stock price crash risk around the world, because such
crashes can be highly detrimental to a country’s economy and the capital market. However, the current liter-
ature on crash risk mainly considers formal institutions such as corporate governance, and few studies have
examined whether informal institutions can inﬂuence ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk. In this paper, we investigate
the relationship between religion and stock price crash risk in terms of an informal institution, which enriches
the literature on stock price crash risk and religion, and also contributes to the ﬁeld of new economic
geography.
Our results show that ﬁrms in a more religious environment have lower ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk in China.
We also ﬁnd the following:
(1) Earnings management and perk consumption have partial intermediary eﬀects on religion and stock
price crash risk. Religion’s eﬀects on crash risk are enacted through the channel of reducing the agency
problems of earnings management and managers’ perk consumption.
(2) Diﬀerent types of religions have diﬀerent eﬀects on crash risk in China. In particular, Taoism has no
association with crash risk whereas the foreign religions of Catholicism and Christianity both signiﬁ-
cantly reduce stock price crash risk.
(3) The eﬀect of religion on stock crash risk depends on the quality of the governance environment. Specif-
ically, the negative relationship between religion and crash risk is more pronounced when the quality of
corporate governance and the legal environment is higher, suggesting that there is a complementary
relationship between religion and formal governance mechanisms.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to demonstrate that religion plays a
governance role in relieving management opportunism problems and thus reducing ﬁrm-speciﬁc crash risk
W. Li, G. Cai / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 235–250 249in the transformation of socialist China. Our ﬁndings have implications for how to recognize and eﬀectively
improve the positive role of religion in corporate governance in weak governance environments. It is of vital
importance to note that religion can work well only when the quality of corporate governance and the legal
environment are improved.
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